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P o l it ic a l In s t it u t io n s in
J . R . R . T o l k i e n 's M i d d l e - e a r t h :
O r , H o w I L e a r n e d t o S t o p W o r r y in g
A bout the Lack of D em ocracy
D o m in ic J. N a rd i, Jr.1

P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s h a v e s o m e t i m e s s tr u g g le d with the depiction of
politics in Tolkien's M iddle-earth legendarium, especially with its treatment of
democracy. The heroes fight to restore monarchy and seem skeptical of m odern
political values, such as equality and popular participation. Blackburn (64) even goes
so far as to allege that Tolkien's characters possess a "naive" faith in enlightened
despotism. However, the dichotomy between democracy and dictatorship/
authoritarianism overlooks im portant features of Middle-earth politics. The lack of
formal democratic institutions does not mean that the citizens blindly accept
despotism. Rather, I propose that we can better understand Tolkien's legendarium by
focusing on the extent to which political relationships are institutionalized.
I begin the paper in Section 1 by justifying the need for a reevaluation of
politics in Tolkien's legendarium. In Section 2, I demonstrate the problems with the
dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy both in real life and in
speculative fiction. In Section 3, I discuss the treatm ent of democracy both in
Tolkien's letters and in his legendarium. In Section 4, I examine how
institutionalization varies across the Shire, Lake-town, Rohan, Gondor, Isengard, and
Mordor. In Section 5, I attem pt to provide a possible explanation for this variation
using a game theoretic model. In Section 6, I speculate as to w hy immortality might
make Elven politics more consensual. Finally, I conclude in Section 7 with a call for
greater dialogue between political science and scholars of speculative fiction.
I have three goals in this paper. First, I hope to better und erstan d —and at
times correct misperceptions regarding—how Tolkien's worldview informed his
literature. Tolkien's legendarium is not a political treatise, but his works do reflect
concerns about political institutions. Second, I introduce new framework for
understanding politics in Middle-earth. This should prove especially useful for 21st
century readers, m any of who likely—if unjustly—regard unconstitutional monarchy
1This paper was the winner of the Alexei Kondratiev Student Paper Award at Mythcon 45,
Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts.
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as equivalent to tyranny. This approach can also identify political variables
overlooked in the existing literature. Finally, this paper is an experiment in
application of political science to the study of speculative fiction. Applying existing
analytical tools to radically different types of political systems forces political
scientists to think carefully about the generalizability of and assumptions underlying
those tools.
N aivete or Fantasy? The need for a reevaluation
There has been relatively little analysis of politics in Tolkien legendarium.
One strain of scholarship criticizes the depiction of politics in M iddle-earth as
unrealistic or undemocratic. Barnett worries that The Lord of the Rings presents "a
distorted picture of politics" because all decisions are resolved by consensus with
little sign of debate (386). Blackburn alleges that the characters demonstrate "blind
faith in [their] political leaders" (64).2 Other scholars have gone so far as to criticize
Tolkien for prom oting nationalism or fascism (see, e.g., Stimpson 8; Inglis 40).
However, Curry (36-42) counters that a careful reading of the texts evinces little
support for enlightened despotism, m uch less fascism. Tolkien himself strongly
condemned Nazism (e.g., Letters 37).
One challenge to studying politics in Tolkien's legendarium is that the texts
do not provide detailed information about political institutions. Ironically, Tolkien
was not a terse writer; he famously included minute details about M iddle-earth
geography and reprinted entire poems. Despite this, there is almost no mention of
formal political institutions, such as legislatures or judicial systems. Political disputes are
resolved through consensus or moral authority, not by reference to institutional rules
rules or procedures. Given that Tolkien engaged in deliberate and careful world
building, this omission is notew orthy and forces a closer reading of the text if we
wish to truly understand political relationships in Tolkien's legendarium.
We should be wary of using "m undane w orld" history or ideology to "fill
in" such gaps. Tolkien famously disliked "mere" allegory in fiction (e.g., Letters
144), even warning that The Lord of the Rings "is neither allegorical nor topical"
(The Lord of the Rings [LotR] Foreword xxiii). Just as readers should not equate the War
of the Ring with World War II, it would also be an oversimplification to transpose
all of our assumptions and stereotypes about historical monarchies onto Gondor or
Rohan. Given the vast differences between the "m undane world" and Middle-

2 Game of Thrones author George R. R. Martin raises a similar critique:
Lord of the Rings had a very medieval philosophy [...]. Tolkien can say that Aragorn
became king and reigned for a hundred years, and he was wise and good. But
Tolkien doesn't ask the question: What was Aragorn's tax policy? [...] In real life,
real-life kings had real-life problems to deal with. Just being a good guy was not the
answer. You had to make hard, hard decisions. (Gilmore 2014)
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earth —including wizards and m agic—it is not surprising that political institutions
in Tolkien's legendarium do not always resemble our own.
Although Tolkien conceived of his legendarium as taking place in a
mythicized northern Europe (Shippey xv-xvi), M iddle-earth politics differs from that
of medieval fantasy literature in im portant ways. In some northern European
traditions, societies chose leaders through acclamation rather than heredity. Rulers
would build support by distributing patronage to elites. The most famous
example appears in Beowulf, where we see King Hrothgar "dol[ing] out rings and
torques" (line 80), as well as Beowulf's own ascension to the kingship.3 By contrast,
we observe very little patronage politics or elite bargaining in Middle-earth. Kings
tend to ascend to the throne through heredity, not acclamation.4 Even more
surprisingly, both the Shire and Lake-town do have relatively m odern democratic
governments, which w ould have been anachronistic in medieval literature.
H ow should we understand regime types in Middle-earth? W hat factors
shape the relationship between subjects and rulers? Neither the medieval setting nor
analogies to m odern politics allow provides satisfactory answers. In this paper, I take
an alternative approach by using the political science literature. Even in the
"m undane world," political scientists cannot always obtain information about how
political systems operate. Not all governments are transparent and some of the most
im portant political negotiations occur behind closed doors. The discipline has
developed statistical and game theoretic models in order to make inferences about
political behavior. These m ethods can help compensate for the lack of detail about
politics in Tolkien's work and uncover the underlying logic of political behavior in
Middle-earth.
Beyond D emocracy & D ictatorship: Why the King should return
Despite the existence of democracy in Middle-earth, the m odern dichotomy
between democracy and dictatorship/authoritarianism fails to capture key aspects
of politics in Middle-earth. Although humans, Elves, and Dwarves are called the
"Free Peoples" of M iddle-earth (e.g., LotR II.iii.275), they do not have democratic
governments. The two m ost common measures of democratization, Polity and
Freedom House scores (see Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 1-3; Freedom House), would
likely classify Mordor, Gondor, Rohan, and the Elven realms as "authoritarian." In
addition, M iddle-earth societies are not egalitarian; characters are conscious of class
3 Even some contemporary medieval fantasy touches upon these themes. T.H. White's The Once
and Future King uses the Round Table to symbolize King Arthur's need to consult with advisors
and elites.
4 There is one instance that superficially resembles acclamation, when Faramir asks a crowd
outside the gates of Gondor if they accept Aragorn as king. However, Ioreth notes that this was
"just a ceremony [...] for [Aragorn] has already entered" (LotR VI.5.967). In other words,
acclamation does not actually confer power.
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and in some cases social mobility is limited (see Donnelly 18). Yet, Tolkien clearly
does not ascribe the same normative value to democracy that Freedom House and
Polity scores imply. In other words, Lake-town's government is not depicted as
superior to Rohan's, despite Lake-town's status as a democracy.
In the "m undane world," political scientists have increasingly moved away
from the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism to focus on institutions
more broadly across different regime types (e.g., Gandhi xix-xxi; Shapiro 326-329). For
this paper, I define an "institution" as: 1) a relatively enduring set of rules and
organized practices; 2) em bedded in structures of m eaning and resources; and 3)
invariant in the face of personnel turnover and individual preferences (March and
Olsen 3-4).5 Institutional rules define how political actions translate into outcomes.
This definition is flexible enough to accommodate M iddle-earth's relatively informal
politics. An "institution" does not necessarily have to be a government body or actor,
such as the stewardship of Gondor. For example, the oath that the Guards of the
Citadel swear is an institution in that it is an organized practice that has endured
under several generations of stewards.
Although political institutions can enable better governance outcomes,
institutionalizing political relationships inevitably creates barriers between ruler
and subject. For example, in presidential democracies, terms of office lock voters
and politicians into a formal social contract that usually cannot be broken or
am ended until the next election (Mainwaring 199). If a new crisis arises or voters
change their mind, voters are stuck with the leaders currently in power. Leaders
elected to manage one problem might be poorly equipped to address the next—
much as the Master fostered a thriving economy but proved inept at defending
Lake-town against a dragon. This risk is mitigated to an extent in parliamentary
systems, where the legislature can call for a vote of no confidence (see Strom 265).
However, even snap elections are no guarantee that democracy is actually
representative and accountable to the public. Voting rules affect voting outcomes
such that the order and m anner in which legislators vote can have a determinative
effect on the outcome.6
It is possible to mitigate these problems, but only by limiting
government representativeness, accountability, or efficiency. In the " m undane
world," politicians establish rules, such as delegating authority to legislative
committees, to prevent legislatures from constantly cycling through policies (Shepsle
28). The committee can then use its specialized knowledge to narrow the range of
options brought to a floor vote. However, this gives a subset of legislators

5 The third prong of this definition explains why this paper does not focus on the characteristics
of individual leaders in Middle-earth. Although leadership is crucial, aspects of politics that
depend upon a particular leader's preferences are not institutionalized.
6As demonstrated by the infamous Condorcet Paradox.
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disproportionate power over the agenda. Democratic governments also regularly
entrust unelected bureaucrats and judges to formulate policies and manage disputes
(e.g., H u b er and Shipan 2; Bickel 30). Although these institutional innovations can
and sometimes do produce beneficial governance outcomes, they also complicate the
notion that democracy enables direct interaction between citizens and political
leaders.
In theory, elections should allow voters to hold corrupt politicians
accountable (Ferraz and Finan 1274), but in practice elections can encourage
corruption because politicians need funds in order to finance their campaigns.
Empirically, long-established, liberal democracies tend to suffer less corruption, but
there is considerable variation amongst younger democracies, some of which suffer
extreme levels of corruption (Treisman 218-219). In open-list proportional
representation systems, m ore competitive elections even appear to encourage more
corruption; as the num ber of voters in a constituency increases, campaign finance
violations also increase (Chang and Golden 115). Moreover, it is difficult for voters
to hold leaders accountable for corruption because it occurs outside of public view (c.f.
Cheibub and Przeworski 238).
Charismatic leaders can take advantage of this information asymmetry in
order to distract voters from corruption or poor government performance. Problems
can always be blamed on subversive groups or external forces. Such concerns lead some
voters to only trust leaders who do not openly seek power. Tolkien himself appeared
sympathetic to this view, remarking, "m ediae v a ls were only too right in taking nolo
episcopari as the as the best reason a m an could give to others for making him a
bishop" (Letters 64). This of course gives politicians an incentive to —often
disingenuously—disavow any interest in higher office, further distorting the
relationship between ruler and subject. 7
Nor is democracy necessarily a precondition for economic growth and
good governance. Some research suggests that democracy increases provision of
public goods, such as education and healthcare (see, e.g., Sen 16; Przeworski and
Limongi 168-169; Lake and Baum 617-618; Blaydes and Kayser 2). However, other
scholars have challenged these results for underrepresenting high-performing
authoritarian regimes (Ross 863-864) and oversimplifying measures for democracy
(Cheibub et al. 68). Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, several autocracies,
including China, have provided economic growth and public goods provision at
least as well as the average democracy (Clark et al. 2-3).
More recent m odels suggest that political constraints, not regime type,
provide the key to explaining governm ent perform ance. In the Selectorate model

7 Frank Herbert's Dune novels explored the dangers of charismatic leaders, leading him to
observe in Chapterhouse Dune: "It is not that power corrupts but that it is magnetic to the
corruptible" (59).
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(see de Mesquita et al. 77-105), a leader m ust maximize his/her support by
distributing patronage to the group that selects the leader (i.e., the selectorate).
He/she m ust distribute enough to thwart potential challengers. The larger the
selectorate, the greater the incentive to enact policies benefitting the populace at
large rather than engaging in embezzlement. In democracies, the selectorate tends to
encompass the entire voting-age populace. In a similar model, Myerson (134-135)
shows that, in the face of competition, rulers have an incentive to establish a strong
royal court to serve as a commitment to supporters. These models are particularly
helpful for M iddle-earth because they demonstrate that one does not need democracy
or even formal institutions in order to constrain political rulers.
D emocracy in M iddle-earth: W ho elected the M aster?
Given these insights from the political science literature, it is worth
reexamining the problem of democracy in Tolkien's legendarium. Tolkien does not use
the failure of democracy or political leaders in Middle-earth as an excuse to accept
dictatorship. In fact, we see subjects and subordinates actively resisting bad
government. Both Eomer and Beregond dissent against unwise orders when the kings
of Rohan and Gondor fall under corrupt influences (Grima Wormtongue and the
palantir, respectively). After a brief punishment, both are rehabilitated and their dissent
at least partially legitimated. In The Return of the King, the Hobbits even launch an
insurgency against Sharkey and his thugs. As Curry notes, "what is 'The Scouring of the
Shire' [...] but an account of local resistance to fascist thuggery and forced
modernization?" (41).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to democracy comes from Lake-town. According to
Blackburn, the contrast between the Master and Bard suggests that:
what is wrong with democracy is that it carries to power, not those who have the
best right to rule as stewards of the common good, but those who, through the
power of their eloquence, are able to manipulate the ignorant masses. (64)
However, even here it appears that the problem is in how Lake-town institutionalized
democracy rather than popular participation generally. The narrator in The Hobbit tells
the reader that the Master owed his position to "trade and tolls, to cargoes and gold"
(Hobbit X.210). This could simply mean that residents approved the Master's
management of the economy, but could also imply that the Master used patronage to
influence the outcome of elections. Moreover, the Master does not internalize popular
sentiment in order to deliberate on policy, but rather follows the "general clamour"
(X.211). By contrast, the restoration of monarchy does not lead to the abolition of
popular participation. When Bard is described as rewarding "his followers and friends
freely" (XVIII.304), it is hard not to see hints of the Selectorate m odel's informal
constraints and patronage politics.
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Some of Tolkien’s letters do express skepticism of democracy. In a 1944 letter
to his son Christopher, he points out that the Greek word for democracy
(δημοχρατὶα) better translates as “mob-rule” (Letters 107). In discussing Hobbit
values, he declares, “Not that I am a ‘democrat’ in any of its current uses […]” (215).
However, a closer analysis suggests that Tolkien’s criticism centers on modern,
institutionalized democracy, not on popular participation in governance. This is
perhaps best expressed in a 1956 letter, where he claims, “I am not a ‘democrat’
only because ‘humility’ and equality are spiritual principles corrupted by the attempt
to mechanize and formalize them” (246, emphasis added). In this context, the failure of
Lake-town stems from the lack of a dialogue between government and the people; the
Master follows the forms of democracy, but does not provide leadership (i.e., “mobrule”).
Tolkien describes his own political leanings as “more and more to Anarchy
(philosophically understood, meaning abolition of control […])—or to
‘unconstitutional’ Monarchy” (Letters 63). Political scientists would typically place
“unconstitutional monarchy” and “anarchy” near opposite ends of the political
spectrum (in fact, dictators often equate “democracy” with “anarchy”). However, by
grouping these two regime types together, Tolkien is emphasizing his aversion to
institutionalization. During the 1930s and 1940s, the world’s major democracies had
drastically expended the size and scope of government in response to the Great
Depression and World War II. Totalitarianism, with its regimentation of society,
represented an even more extreme form of institutionalization. For somebody who
preferred deinstitutionalized politics, neither option was a viable alternative.
Ultimately, Tolkien’s legendarium is not a political manifesto8 and does not
attempt to solve the problems of institutionalized democracy. Taken literally, The Lord of
the Rings would be, as Blackburn claims, “dangerous as a guide to deeds” (62).
However, the legendarium is politically salient in that it engages with broader political
themes. Indeed, in his skepticism of government, Tolkien shares some of the same
concerns that motivated Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s book Governing the Commons.
Ostrom (30-38) argues that community policing can prove more effective in managing
natural resources than either state control or privatization. Her approach does not work
under all conditions and is probably only applicable to smaller communities.
Nevertheless, her scholarship is useful in that it demonstrates the possibility for
something resembling Tolkienian politics even in the modern world.

Especially when compared to Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, published shortly after The Lord of the
Rings.
8
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Va r i a t i o n i n In s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n : Ri n g w r a i t h s a s b u r e a u c r a t s
In this section, I consider how political institutions vary in The Lord of the
Rings.9 In Middle-earth, the most im portant indicators of institutionalization are: 1)
the ability of subjects and rulers to interact, 2) the formality of political processes,
and 3) the layers of bureaucracy. Ideally, political relationships between ruler and
subjects involve two-way communication (see Figure 1). Rulers transm it commands
to the populace through laws, bureaucracy, speeches, or propaganda. At the same
time, rulers need information about subjects' preferences to ensure that they do
not become so dissatisfied as to attem pt regime change. Subjects can also provide
rulers with useful insight about the enforcement and impact of governm ent policies
(McCubbins and Schwarts 165).

Command
Ruler

Subject
Feedback

Figure 1: Model of Interaction between Ruler and Subject
Governments need to find an equilibrium between command and feedback.
Relying solely on information provided by subjects risks mob rule. The U.S.9

9 It is w o rth d iscussing w h a t constitutes dom estic politics in th is context. Sovereignty in M iddlee arth appears m ore fluid th a n the n o rm for m o d e rn nation-states. For exam ple, as k ing of
G ondor, Elessar is expected to keep the peace o n ro a d s as far n o rth as R ivendell (LotR VI.6.988)
a n d prohibits M en from entering th e Shire (App.B.1097). D espite this, Shire H obbits never
beh av e as if th ey ow e allegiance to G ondor. The Shire has its o w n governm ent, w h ic h regulates
all dom estic m atters. G ondor o nly seem s in volved in th e Shire's interaction w ith th e outside
w orld.
In general, I consider a realm sufficiently a u tonom ous if there is a governm ent th at
reg u lates dom estic affairs a n d there appears to b e n o overlap p in g dom estic jurisdiction w ith
a nother governm ent. A ccordingly, it w o u ld b e m ore ap p ro p ria te to characterize th e G ondorShire relationship as international, even if n o m inally the Shire falls u n d e r G o n d o r's aegis. In the
"m u n d an e w o rld ," su ch inform al relations b e tw ee n g reat p o w ers a n d trib u taries w ere not
u n co m m o n before th e 1648 T reaty of W estphalia. E ven in the 21st century, th e U nited States
p ro v id es p ublic goods a n d security to other states, such as p atrolling international w aterw ays.
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Founding Fathers created a representative government in order to receive information
about citizens' preferences, but combined it with checks and balances to avoid a
tyranny of the majority (e.g., M adison No. 51). Authoritarian regimes also need
feedback, but subjects are less likely to volunteer information that contradicts or
criticizes official policy for fear of retribution. This makes gathering accurate
information more costly (see Kuran 30-31).10 Some authoritarian regimes establish
"democratic" institutions, such as legislatures, in order to interact with citizens
and gather information (e.g. Gandhi xix-xxi). Governments can also attem pt to
compensate by creating a vast surveillance apparatus to spy on the populace.
In M iddle-earth, there is considerable variation in the extent to which
governments can issue commands and receive feedback (see Figure 2). At one
extreme, M ordor has a complex political hierarchy with m any bureaucratic layers.
Although we learn relatively little about Mordor, we encounter courtiers (e.g., the
M outh of Sauron), bureaucratic agents (e.g., Ringwraiths), tributary states (e.g.,
Harad), elite soldiers (e.g., trolls), and common troops (e.g., Orcs). Not only is the
hierarchy rigid, but different classes are also strictly segregated by race. There is no
permeability across class lines. Although Orcs m ight sometimes informally converse
amongst themselves, we never observe Ringwraiths or Orc chieftains—m uch less
Sauron him self—informally interacting with Orcs.

Mordor

C om m and

Isengard

Gondor

Rohan

Laketown
Shire

F eedback

Figure 2: Feedback vs. Command in Middle-earth Realms
(Placements along the axes are approximations.)

10 It is this tendency that forces King Henry to dress as a commoner in order to learn about his
soldiers' fears on the eve of battle in Shakespeare's King Henry VIII.
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Sauron's oppression stifles inform ational communication betw een subjects
and ruler. This is not a polity in which subjects willingly volunteer information
likely to upset elites. Two of the M ordor Orcs, Shagrat and Gorbag, are forced to
w hisper their belief that "even the Biggest, can make mistakes" (LotR IV.10.738), as
if acknowledging the fallibility of a leader is cause for punishment. To compensate,
Sauron expends considerable effort conducting surveillance over his realm. As
Shagrat claims, "they've got eyes and ears everywhere" (IV.10.737). In Tolkien's
legendarium, M ordor's omnipresent surveillance apparatus is symbolized by
references to the "Eye of Sauron."11 However, Sauron's efforts ultimately fail.
Throughout The Lord of the Rings, he consistently lacks crucial information about
the Ring and the intentions of the protagonists. He could not even detect the
presence of the Hobbits in M ordor until Frodo puts on the Ring in O rodruin.112
Isengard's political structure resembles M ordor's, but with fewer layers of
hierarchy. Saruman, the undisputed leader, has a courtier (e.g., Grima Wormtongue),
soldiers (e.g., Uruk-hai), and mercenaries (e.g., the Dunlendings). Again, there is no
evidence of social mobility. Although Saruman and W ormtongue do interact, theirs is
not an informal, personal relationship. Saruman constantly emphasizes his
superiority over W ormtongue by issuing arbitrary and abusive commands, such as
the order to kill Lotho Sackville-Baggins. Saruman shows little interest in receiving
feedback from W ormtongue about his policies, going so far as to taunt Wormtongue
for obeying his commands (LotR VI.8.1020). After Sharkey seizes control of Bag-End,
he symbolically and practically cuts himself off from feedback by not revealing
himself to the Hobbits and pretending that Lotho remains in charge.
Gondor and Rohan lie in between the extremes. Both have several layers of
government, including a king, advisors, and generals, but Rohan's hierarchy is
much more horizontal than Gondor's. Before marching to Gondor, Theoden has to
call upon his vassals to m uster their soldiers to Dunharrow. By contrast, Gondor has
a relatively centralized command and control structure, allowing the ruler to
summon troops from outlying territories. Moreover, Gondor has more levels of
hierarchy, including lesser nobles (e.g., Prince Imrahil) and lords of cities (e.g.,
Faramir of Osgiliath). In fact, the Council of Gondor is the only formal political
institution m entioned in the entire legendarium. However, unlike Mordor, Gondorian
subjects can not only interact w ith the elite, but also join it. For example, Beregond—a
"plain m an of arms" with "neither rank nor lordship" (LotR V.1.767)—was promoted
to Captain of the White Company after saving Faramir.
11In Peter Jackson's The Lord of the Rings film adaptations, this Literally becomes a giant flaming
eyeball.
12Although Shagrat brings Frodo's Mithril shirt, Elven cloak, and sword to Lugburz, the Mouth
of Sauron clearly does not know the Hobbits' true mission. As Gandalf says, "Indeed, I know
them all and all their history, and despite your scorn, foul Mouth of Sauron, you cannot say as
much" (LotR V.10.889).
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The parallel oaths that M erry and Pippin swear allow for a direct
comparison of institutionalization in Gondor and Rohan. In Rohan, M erry simply
asks King Theoden, "May I lay the sword of Meriadoc of the Shire on your lap
[...]?" With equal informality, Theoden replies, "Gladly I will take it" (LotR
V.2.777). The oath is not a precondition for M erry to serve and interact with
Theoden, but rather formalizes a relationship that had developed through
conversations about pipeweed and other lighthearted subjects. Where the Rohirrim
oath is informal and personal, the Gondorian process is formal and formulaic. Pippin
swears fealty to Denethor by reciting:
Here do I swear fealty and service to Gondor, and to the Lord and Steward
of the realm, to speak and to be silent, to do and to let be, to come and to
go, in need or plenty, in peace or war, in living or dying, from this hour
henceforth, until my lord release me, or death take me, or the world end. So
say I, Peregrin son of Paladin of the Shire of the Halflings. (LotR V.1.756)
Denethor's response is equally formal and formulaic:
And this do I hear, Denethor son of Ecthelion, Lord of Gondor, Steward of the
High King, and I will not forget it, nor fail to reward that which is given:
fealty with love, valour with honour, oath-breaking with vengeance. (756)
Unlike M erry's oath, Pippin's is part of a scripted ritual in which all soldiers of
Gondor m ust partake; the oath itself is an institution. Pippin and Denethor did not
have a preexisting friendship before the oath and afterwards only interact pursuant to
the fulfillment of their vows. The oath also rigidly delineates responsibilities of
both the ruler and subject, further separating the two and reducing the space for
personal, informal interactions.
Gondor and Rohan demonstrate how institutionalization can lead to a
principal-agent problem. In theory, a bureaucratic agent should act in the best
interests of the ruler. In practice, an agent's preferences m ight diverge from the
ruler's (see Fearon 55-60). For example, Wormtongue would distort and reinterpret
information before passing it on to Theoden. Thus, when Gandalf arrives, he m ust
to remove that layer of bureaucracy in order to ensure that Theoden receives his
message. In Gondor, the palantir erects a similar barrier to communication. Like
Wormtongue, the palantir has a different agenda from Denethor. The palantir does
not actually present untruth, but does tint information with despair. By the siege of
Gondor, Denethor becomes so dependent upon the palantir that he refuses advice
from Faramir before the attack on Osgiliath and from Pippen before nearly
burning Faramir alive. In short, Denethor no longer invests in relationships with
subjects for information.
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A ragorn's ascension to the throne seems to promise a relatively less
formal political relationship w ith his subjects, but he does not completely abolish
formality. His coronation ceremony is marked by ritual, including trumpets, flower
laden streets, and a formal recitation in Elvish (LotR VI.5.967). Indeed, as
Aragorn nears Gondor, he transitions to speaking in more fo rm al-ev en regal—
diction. Although there are crucial differences between Denethor and Aragorn's
reigns, there are also deeper political institutions and rituals in Gondor that do not
disappear after leadership turnover.
Lake-town under the M aster represents another extreme, government ruled
by feedback—or "mob rule." Although Lake-town's government is relatively
underinstitutionalized, those institutions that do exist do not facilitate two-way
communication. The M aster follows the whims of his subjects, presumably to
guarantee his reelection. W hen Thorin and company arrive in The Hobbit, the narrator
reveals that the M aster doubted Thorin's claims to kingship. However, rather than
express his doubts and encourage a debate as to the wisdom of entering the Lonely
Mountain, he simply follows the "general clamour" (Hobbit X.211). He is also pays too
m uch heed to "trade and tolls" (210)—the electorate's short-term concerns—rather
than m aking the grim but foresighted preparations to defend the town. Ironically,
despite his title, the "M aster" is unable to issue unpopular commands or demand
sacrifices from his subjects.
Finally, the Shire has "hardly any 'government'" (LotR Prologue 9),
m aking for a relatively flat political structure. The only political hierarchy is an
elected Mayor, the Thain, and Shirriffs. By the War of the Ring, only twelve
Shirriffs remained in service and the Thainship had become largely honorific. The
M ayor's duties are limited to m anaging banquets, the Messenger Service, the
Watch, and animal control (LotR Prologue 10). The government serves a role in
coordinating and m anaging public services, but appears to have little institutional
power to mobilize or extract resources from Shire society. Although economic and
social inequality do exist in the Shire, there is evidence of significant social mobility.
Sam Gamgee, the archetypal working class Hobbit,13 is elected mayor for seven
seven-year terms. The Shire's minimalist government does come with a cost; as with
Lake-town, the Shire government has insufficient command ability to defend against
external threats (although Mayor Will W hitfoot does earn readers' sympathy for
defying Lotho).

13 The Silmarillion's brief synopsis about the War of the Ring refers to Sam merely as Frodo's
"servant" (303).
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Or i g i n s

G o v e r n m e n t : Wh y t h e S h i r e i s a d e m o c r a c y
In this section, I offer one possible causal explanation for institutional variation
in Middle-earth based on a game theoretic model adapted from the economics
literature (see Hirschman 1). There are two players in the Exit, Voice, & Loyalty game:
a Ruler and a group of Subjects. Before the game begins, the Ruler issues a policy that
costs the Subjects 1 unit of welfare (i.e., in rights or property loss). The Subjects can
then choose to: 1) voice their dissatisfaction, 2) remain loyal to the Ruler, or 3)
exit from the state. In the latter two scenarios, the game ends and both players
receive a payoff (see Figure 3). If the Subjects choose voice, the Ruler can either: 1)
respond to the demands, or 2) ignore them. If the Ruler responds, then the
Subjects remain loyal and both players receive a payoff. If the Ruler ignores them,
the Subjects m ust again choose to: 1) remain loyal, or 2) exit the state.
of

LegendParameters:
E
1
L
C

Citizen’s exit payoff
Value ofbenefit taken fromthe citizenbythe state
State’s value fromhaving a loyal citizen who does not exit
Cost ofusing voice for the citizen

Figure 3: Exit, Voice, & Loyalty Model
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Ultimately, the Ruler and Subjects make their decisions based on the
expected payoff at each stage of the game.14 If the Subjects receive some positive
value from exiting (E > 0), they would prefer to exit rather than remain loyal (E C > 0 - C). Likewise, if there are significant costs associated with exit (E < 0), then
the Subjects would prefer to remain loyal. If the Ruler responds, then the 1 unit of
welfare is returned to the Subjects. However, using voice is costly because Subjects
m ust expend resources (C) in order to mobilize. Thus, the Subjects will only voice
dissent if the value of w hat they lost is greater than the benefit of either loyalty or
exit (1 - C > E > 0 or 1 - C > 0 > E).
After appropriating the citizen's assets, the Ruler receives that 1 unit of
welfare. If the Subjects remain loyal, the Ruler receives a value for their loyalty and
service (L). Thus, the Ruler has an incentive to prevent the Subjects from exiting the
state. If the Ruler values the Subjects' loyalty more than the welfare seized (L > 1),
he/she m ight be willing to respond to their grievances (i.e., return the 1 unit of
welfare) in order to prevent them from fleeing. If this game were extended beyond
one round, the Ruler might need a way to commit to not seizing the Subjects'
assets in order to prevent them from protesting or exiting in the first place. This
might lead the establishment of democracy or a constitution, which would impose
institutional constraints on government discretion (see North and Weingast 805-808).
In the "m undane world," we cannot obtain precise values for E, C, or
L, but we can estimate the relative values based on the bargaining power of
subjects. From the perspective of the ruler, the benefit of subjects' loyalty (L)
depends upon the ease with which the state can extract resources and services. If
subjects can hide their assets or flee, then it becomes more im portant for the state
to retain loyalty in order to prevent capital flight or labor loss (see, e.g., Scott 106). If
the ruler has access to natural resource rents or slave labor, then he/she does not
require subjects' loyalty in order to obtain revenue and services.
Subjects who are more willing and able to leave a polity have a higher exit
value (E) and thus more bargaining power vis-a-vis the ruler. Exit is easier when
subjects possess portable assets that can be taken in the event of flight. By contrast,
loyalty becomes more attractive when dangers outside the polity threaten the
subjects' person or property. In such cases, subjects are more likely to cede power to
the state and allow it to develop stronger institutions in return for protection (see
Tilly 170-175; Slater 5). The costs of voice (C) depend on the ability of subjects to
organize and mobilize themselves. If subjects are relatively self-sufficient and can
survive w ithout assistance from the state, then they face less risk of retribution.
Geography has a particularly im portant impact on these parameters.
H arsh or rugged terrain can impede government efforts to control subjects, while

14Technically, if this were not a game of complete information, one would also need to calculate
each player's beliefs about the other player's choices.

114

Mythlore 125, Fall/Winter 2014

Political Institutions in Tolkien's Middle-earth: or, How I Learned to Stop W orrying

fertile lands can allow subjects to grow their own crops and become self-sufficient.
Fortunately, Tolkien was famously meticulous in the care with which he depicted
M iddle-earth geography, going so far as to include maps in his books (see generally
Fonstad ix-x). Although Tolkien certainly did not have the Exit, Voice, Loyalty
m odel in m ind when writing, because he took such care with the geography it is
reasonable to extrapolate how geography might have affected the development of
political institutions in Middle-earth.
The Shire's geography makes it ideally suited to decentralized, democratic
government. The Shire is described as a hilly area. Most Hobbits — especially the
richest and poorest—build their homes in holes in the ground rather than external
structures (LotR Prologue 7). This makes it relatively easy for Hobbits to hide
themselves and their assets from inspection. The government cannot simply observe
a Hobbit's fields or house to assess his or her wealth. Indeed, after Bilbo returned
from Erebor, the other Hobbits knew he had obtained some treasure, b u t they
could not ascertain the extent of his wealth (I.1.23). Hobbits are also secretive and so
skilled in "the art of disappearing" that hum ans rarely see them (Prologue 1).
Thus, exiting and escaping government oversight is relatively easy. In order to
convince Hobbits to remain loyal, the government m ust make the Shire an appealing
place in which to live—as it seems to have done, given Frodo and Sam's longing
descriptions of their homeland.
Hobbits also demonstrate both the m eans and the will to voice dissent
against oppressive government. The Shire has fertile cropland and can grow enough
food for subsistence (LotR Prologue 9), m eaning that individual Hobbit families do
not require government assistance. Hobbits are frequently depicted engaging in
collective activities, including banquets, showing that private citizens can and do
organize mass events. It took Lotho the assistance of armed hum an ruffians and
Saruman to impose an economic system that does "more gathering than sharing"
(VI.7.999). Despite that advantage, the Hobbits could still engage in massive,
w idespread resistance and overthrow the Lotho-Sharkey regime. In the long run
authoritarianism is simply not a stable equilibrium in the Shire.
Lake-town geography appears to have a similar effect, but for different
reasons. Living on a lake makes exit easier as subjects can hide their assets
underw ater or flee using their boats.15 Before Smaug's attack, Lake-town has
bountiful resources, including fish. The residents discount Bard's prophesies of
"anything from floods to poisoned fish," suggesting neither had happened recently
(Hobbit XIV.258). Assuming residents have access to fishing gear and boats, they are

15 This occurred in Peter Jackson's film adaptation, The Desolation of Smaug, when Bard hides
weapons in the water under his house.
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not dependent upon the M aster for their livelihoods.16 As in the Shire, the people of
Lake-town demonstrate their autonom y by overthrowing the Master and installing
Bard as king. It is notew orthy that the only two examples of successful domestic
revolutions in Tolkien's legendarium occur in the two states with the least costly exit
options.
At the opposite extreme, M ordor's geography facilitates totalitarianism
and stifles resistance. The Plains of Gorgoroth are described as deserts where
nothing grows and the water is bitter (LotR VI.2.923). Rather, food comes from
"slave-worked fields" in the Lake N urnen region, giving the state a monopoly over the
supply and distribution of provisions—and making Orcs dependent on the state for
their livelihoods. Despite the low quality of life, exit is not feasible. Outside
Mordor, Elves, Men, and Dwarves kill Orcs indiscriminately, to the extent that elfcountries instill a "cold fear" (LotR VI.1.907). As such, defection to neighboring states
is not an option. By contrast, as part of Sauron's army, Orcs not only receive
collective defense, but also war booty. Thus, even if they evade M ordor's internal
surveillance system, the benefits of fleeing M ordor are low compared to those of
remaining loyal.
If Orcs were to attem pt flight, M ordor's geography makes doing so nearly
impossible. M ordor is enclosed by the Ered Lithui ("Ash M ountains") in the north
and the Ephel Duath ("Fence of Shadow") in the west and the south, blocking
overland passage. The only accessible exits are through the heavily guarded Black
Gate (Morannon), Minas Morgul, or Shelob's lair. Aside from Orodruin, the land
within the boundaries of M ordor is flat and barren, providing the "Eye" of Sauron an
unobstructed view of any point within his realm. Indeed, Shagrat and Gorbag express
a desire to desert, but fear that they w ould be caught (LotR IV.10.738). For Sauron,
Orcs are expendable, in part because he can recruit additional mercenaries from Harad
and Rhun. In short, Sauron has no incentive to accommodate any Orc dem ands for
greater rights or share of the booty because Orcs have no bargaining power.
Rohan's geography makes a relatively decentralized government likely, but
still allows for monarchy. Rohan is covered by a vast plains situated in a vale between
the M isty Mountains and the White Mountains. This has two im portant implications.
First, as in the Shire, the fertile plains provide greater agricultural opportunities,
allowing farmers to be relatively self-sufficient. This prevents Rohirrim from being
too dependent upon the king. In fact, the king is dependent upon vassals to supply
m ilitary forces (see LotR V.3 "The Muster of Rohan"). Second, the land is suitable for
16 There are other hints that Lake-town was not poor. The narrator notes that the people of Laketown "still throve on the trade" [emphasis added] (Hobbit X.204). They even have enough spare
resources to supply Thorin's company and dress them "in fine cloth of their proper colours"
(emphasis added, X.211). Interestingly, The Desolation of Smaug depicts Lake-town as an
authoritarian state in which resources are scarce. The Master rejects elections and has a vast spy
network. Bard threatens Alfred with food riots if he cannot bring his fish past the tollgate.
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horses and Rohan is a horse culture. Horses provide the Rohirrim with m uch greater
mobility, m aking both collective mobilization and flight easier. However, both horses
and farmland are observable—and hence taxable-assets, giving the king some
leverage in extracting resources from his subjects.
G ondor's geography allows for more centralized government than Rohan's.
The Pelennor Fields are relatively fertile, providing sustenance for Gondorians.
However, the realm of Gondor is spread out along the edges of the White
Mountains, the Anduin River, and Bay of Belfalas; with a population spread over
such a large area, it is relatively difficult for citizens to engage in collective
mobilization.17 Perhaps the m ost im portant feature of G ondor's geography is its
location opposite the Black Gates. As Boromir points out, Gondor has long served
as the front line of defense against Sauron's forces (LotR II.2.245). Given the outside
threat, exit is a less attractive option. Gondorians are more willing to cede wealth and
power to the state in return for protection, allowing rulers to fund massive
infrastructure projects like the Great Gate of Minas Tirith.
Following this logic, we should expect the Rohirrim to be more likely to voice
dissent against oppressive or arbitrary rule than the Men of Gondor. Although the
Rohirrim do not collectively initiate open revolt against Grima Wormtongue, some
individuals do engage in active or passive resistance. Eomer questions decisions
Theoden m ade while under W ormtongue's influence and is subsequently exiled.
Later, Ham a perm its Gandalf to bring his staff into Meduseld, disobeying clear
orders to the contrary. By contrast, in Gondor there is no purely indigenous
resistance against Denethor's reckless decisions. Faramir obeys Denethor's orders
to recapture Osgiliath, despite his better judgment. Beregond only attempts to
prevent Denethor from burning Faramir at Pippin's urging. Unlike Eomer and
Hama, who were not punished for their dissent, Aragorn prohibits Beregond from ever
setting foot in Minas Tirith (although this is coupled with a promotion to captain).
We know relatively little about the internal politics of Isengard, but there is
some evidence to suggest exit is relatively costly. The tower of Orthanc is surrounded
by the Ring of Isengard, a large, circular stone wall. The only exit points are the River
Isen and the Gate of Isengard, m aking exit from the immediate vicinity difficult. The
area surrounding Isengard was originally covered by forest, which would have m ade
exit and hiding easier. However, Saruman cut m ost of the trees down in order to fuel
his war machines, incidentally also m aking it easier for Saruman to track his
subordinates. Moreover, just as M ordor Orcs fear the Elves, any Uruk-hai and Wild
Men who flee Isengard w ould confront the Rohirrim, who in the The Two Towers hunt

17 The Druadan Forest provides an instructive counterexample. Although in Gondor, is much
more difficult for governments to penetrate forests, allowing the Woses (Wild Men of the
Woods) to live there in autonomy. They appear to have no allegiance to Gondor, even when
they find out that Minas Tirith is under attack.
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and kill a band of Uruk-hai m erely for trespassing on Rohan territory. Although not
quite as difficult as in M ordor, Orcs have relatively little incentive to flee or resist
Saruman. W ormtongue's spiteful comments against Saruman are the only visible
signs of dissent in Isengard, and even those serve to emphasize Sarum an's hold over
his servants.
Shire

Resistance to Government

Laketown
regime change

Rohan

Gondor

Isengard
Mordor

Cost of Exit

Figure 4: Exit vs. Resistance in Middle-earth Realms
(Placements along the axes are approximations.)
Following this analysis, there is indeed a correlation between the cost of exit
as determ ined by geography and the am ount of resistance to oppressive or arbitrary
government (see Figure 4). However, I certainly do not mean to imply geographic
determinism. Other potential factors, such as leadership, can and do matter. For
example, the M aster could have tried to emphasize the threat of the dragon in order to
militarize Lake-town and quell any opposition to his power. Instead, he chooses to
ignore the threat, diminishing the effect that Lake-town's proximity to the Lonely
Mountain has on local politics. The game theoretic model simply demonstrates that
under certain conditions leaders' choices are constrained by geography and other
variables.
Elven Exceptionalism: M ortal politics, immortal Elves
The Elven realms do not quite fit into m y theoretical framework. They are
not democratic. Both Rivendell and Lothlorien have highly centralized governments,
w ith leaders who remain in power for centuries (i.e., Elrond and Galadriel), despite
very different geographies. Despite this, and contrary to w hat Barnett claims, Elven
realms are not "essentially totalitarian" (385). Elven leaders are highly consensual,
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even to the point of refusing to impose their will on others (Ruane and James 22). For
example, w hen Elrond chairs the Council, he allows the various parties—including
Dwarves and M en—to participate in the debate, even though given the circumstances
he might have been justified in invoking emergency powers to expedite the meeting.
U pon m eeting Gildor, Frodo recalls an adage that one should not go "to the elves for
counsel, for they will say both no and yes" (LotR I.3.84).
Current political science tools are simply not properly equipped to analyze
immortal beings such as Elves. Models such as Exit, Voice, and Loyalty assume that
participants have relatively short time horizons. Rulers find political power valuable
because they can use it to enact policy change or extract resource rents. Abuse of
power, such as theft of public property or natural resource destruction, might be
attractive because the perpetrators receive immediate gains but do not have to deal
w ith the long-term consequences. However, because Elves are immortal, they have
m uch longer time horizons. In theory, Elven rulers and subjects could find
themselves interacting over an infinite period of time. In this respect, although
Hobbits and Orcs are both fantastical races, they more closely resemble hum ans than
Elves do.18
Immortality could lead to a very different equilibrium in a game theoretic
model as players revise their expectations over time. For example, Axelrod and
Hamilton (1393-1395) show that, over the long run, there are viable strategies that
lead to more cooperative outcomes in non-cooperative game theoretic models. If one
player behaves non-cooperatively, then the other player can inflict a punishm ent
during future rounds. Thus, reputation becomes crucial to deterring bad behavior.
Something similar might have occurred amongst the Elves. In The Silmarillion, Elves
initially appear interested in worldly power; even Galadriel yearns for a realm of her
own (84). The Noldor attack other Elves who refuse to aid their quest for the
Silmarils, leading to the Kinslayings. Ultimately, the decline in the N oldor's
reputation and the m adness w rought by Feanor's oath serves as a lesson in the costs
of non-cooperative behavior. By the Second Age, the Elves had settled into a more
consensual and peaceful pattern of politics.
Conclusions: What the Two Towers can teach the Ivory Tower
In this paper, I offer one possible causal explanation for the political
behaviors we observe in Middle-earth. I cannot and do not claim that Tolkien
consciously or even unconsciously used such reasoning in w riting his legendarium.
Rather, the point of this exercise is to demonstrate that there is a logic to politics in
M iddle-earth that is, at the least, not inconsistent with the political science literature.

18Sauron is also immortal, but because his subjects are mortal a single-round game still applies.
Immortality simply gives Sauron an even greater bargaining position because he can outwait
any Orc demands for greater rights or resources.
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As noted above, the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism
breaks down in Middle-earth. Instead, the more salient difference is the extent to
which relationships between ruler and subject are institutionalized. In some polities,
such as Mordor, relations are formal and the obstructed by m ultiple layers of
hierarchy. By contrast, in the Shire, governm ent is decentralized and flat. Moreover,
as anticipated by the Exit, Voice, and Loyalty model, M iddle-earth realms with a more
mobile and em powered citizenry are more likely to have less institutionalized
governments. Finally, I posit that immortality m ight make Elves more cooperative
over the longer term.
Ultimately, we should not expect speculative fiction to be perfectly
consistent w ith political science. As the Elven example demonstrates, there are
sometimes differences between a subcreation and the "m undane w orld" that lead to
divergent outcomes. Rather than preventing dialogue, this tension creates
opportunities. One of the biggest challenges in political science is that we have
limited counterfactuals. For example, we cannot compare economic growth in the
United States under both democracy and dictatorship because historically only one
possibility exists at a given time. O ut of necessity, political scientists compare two
different polities or time periods, but it is nearly impossible to control for all potential
variables. By contrast, speculative fiction allows us to explore counterfactuals that we
cannot replicate in the "m undane world" (i.e., it is easier to write about an Al Gore
administration than to change the results of the 2000 election). As Ruby points out,
"the only place in which [we] could explore the sociology of a situation that has not
yet happened is in fiction" (128). Thoughtful sub-creation design can allow us to test
political science with more interesting and rigorous counterfactuals.
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T h e M y th o p o e ic S o c ie ty

A n d

E n jo y :

•

Thought-Provoking and Respected Publications
Our reviews quarterly Mythprint (free with membership) keeps readers up to date on newly
published fantasy Literature, films and academic titles. Members also receive the Annual Report
and Member Directory. The peer-reviewed journal Mythlore features scholarly articles on
mythopoeic literature. Our annual literary magazine, Mythic Circle, publishes new fiction, art
and poetry with mythopoeic themes. The Mythopoeic Press publishes both scholarly editions of
literary works and critical essays. The Society also produces specialized works on Tolkien's
invented languages and other topics. Members receive advance notice of new publications and
special discounted rates.

•

Outstanding Conferences
Our annual conference (Mythcon) encourages scholars, authors, and readers to exchange ideas
and share their insights and love of mythopoeic literature. Guests of Honor have included
authors such as Neil Gaiman, Ursula K. Le Guin, and Tim Powers, as well as noted scholars such
as Michael Drout, Verlyn Flieger, Douglas Anderson and Christopher Tolkien. As a small
conference, we enjoy an intimacy with our guests that most conferences cannot provide. The
Society has been instrumental in the development and encouragement of young scholars. There
is a special award for best student paper at Mythcon, and funding to help "starving scholars"
defray conference costs. Society members receive big discounts on registration and can share
in other benefits.

•

Literary and Scholarly Awards
Our Society's book awards nominees are selected by our members. Society members can
nominate books for the Mythopoeic Fantasy Awards for both adults and children or for the
Mythopoeic Scholarship Awards in Inklings Studies and Myth and Fantasy Studies. Society
members may also serve on the juries to review nominees and select winners.

•

Communities of Readers and S cholars
Society members share their love and scholarly interests in fantasy literature through organized
discussion groups in various regions across the United States. They can also join an email
discussion group, connect through our Facebook group, follow us on Twitter, or use other social
media options. From our "Members" page you can link to your own web site or blog.

•

Keeping the Mythopoeic Flame A live
The Mythopoeic Society (founded in 1967) is one of the oldest organizations extant for those
interested in fantasy and its study and appreciation. Though we have made impressive
contributions to Mythopoeic Studies, we have always been a small nonprofit, run totally by
unpaid volunteers. Without memberships, we'd cease to exist. We cover all the Inklings. We welcome
scholars from a variety of disciplines, independent scholars, and anyone who reads and loves
fantasy literature. As a member you can have influence on the direction of the Society by
voting on its leadership—or become part of that leadership yourself.

